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MONGOLIA IN  NORTHEAST   ASIA—THE  NEW  REALITIES
By Alicia Campi (USA)
Mongolia’s view of its relationship and integration with Northeast Asia
over the last few decades has evolved considerably.  During the socialist era of
1921-1989, when its foreign and economic policies were dominated by the Soviet
Union and influenced by both countries’ volatile relationship with the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), Mongolia was often suspicious of and distant from
its Northeast Asian regional neighbors. In the 1930s Japan, through its
occupation of Manchuria, became actively interested in Mongolia, and promoted
Pan-Mongol propaganda.  The Soviet Union saw Japanese activities as a direct
threat to its control of Siberia, leading Stalin to conclude a mutual defense pact
with Mongolia which permitted Soviet troops to be stationed in the country.
Spying for Japan was used as the pretext for purges among Mongolia’s
government and military.  The Japanese attack in eastern Mongolia along the
Nomin River in 1939, although successfully repulsed, further alienated Mongolia
from any association with this regional neighbor.  Dr. Ts. Batbayar has written,
“The image of Japan as “an enemy” and of the Japanese people as “samurai
warriors” were cultivated very strongly in the minds of ordinary Mongols during
the Soviet period,” through ideological propaganda.1  Afterwards, during the
Cold War, Mongolia withdrew even further into isolation in response to Japan’s
role as a staging base for American troops in the Korean War, and the
establishment of a South Korean Government in rivalry to the communist North
Korea.
It can be argued that it was Mikhail Gorbachev’s rethinking of Russia’s
role in Northeast Asia, as epitomized by his 1986 Vladivostok initiative,2 which
was the catalyst for Mongolia’s seeking a more active role in Northeast Asia.  In
fact, when Gorbachev at Vladivostok offered to remove some Soviet troops
from Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar understood that it too was going to have to employ
“new thinking” in its foreign policy and strategy for the region.  Mongolia was
given permission to move forward on negotiations to establish diplomatic
relations with the U.S. during Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze’s
1 Tsedendamba Batbayar, “Mongolia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s:  New Identity and
New Challenges,” RSIM, No. 17, 2002, pg. 204.
2 For further interpretation see  Sharad K. Soni, Mongolia-Russia Relations, Kiakhta to
Vladivostok (Shipra Publications:  New Delhi), 2002, pp. 217-225.
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January 1986 visit to Ulaanbaatar.  The fears of and pressures on the Mongolian
leadership during those years are outlined in D. Yondon’s book, The Big Veto.3
January 27, 1987 bi-lateral relations were formally established.  That same year
Mongolia’s Foreign Minister visited Japan.  In August 1989 Mongolia suggested
the creation of a political dialogue mechanism in Northeast Asia to discuss
non-political issues, aimed at cooperation in the fields of economy, science and
technology, culture and education, ecology and humanitarian links.4
Mongolia experienced its own peaceful revolution against communism in
the spring of 1990.  The Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP),
acutely aware of the dramatically changing international situation throughout
the collapsing Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as influenced by the
Tian An Men incident in the PRC (of maintaining communism at gunpoint),
decided to renounce its communist philosophy and open up the nation.
Diplomatic relations were established with the Republic of Korea (South Korea)
in 1990, despite Mongolia’s traditional strong ties to North Korea.
In the beginning of the 1990s Mongolia’s bilateral relations with crisis-
filled Russia broke down.  Although a February 1991 visit of Mongolian Prime
Minister D. Byambasuren to Moscow concluded a new Declaration on
Friendship and Good-Neighborly Cooperation, which included a protocol on
economic cooperation, Soviet-era construction projects quickly were withdrawn;
trading of Mongolian copper and other minerals, meat products, leather goods,
and carpets for Russian oil and energy-related spare parts in a new hard currency
system had to be suspended because Moscow had no funds; and the issue of
the huge Mongol debt to Russia could not be resolved.  The import of petroleum
products in early 1992 was reduced to only 21% of needed supplies,5 resulting
in great hardship that winter for the Mongolian people.  It was clear that new
sources of energy and consumer goods immediately needed to be found.
3 D. Yondon, Ulaanbaatar, 1997.  This book has been translated into English by R.
Baasan at Indiana University and the contents will be analyzed in her upcoming book with
A. Campi on The History of U.S. and Mongolian Relations in the 20th Century.
4 Ts. Batbayar and K, Demberel, “Contemporary Mongolian-Russian relations:  Problems
and Perspectives,” in proceedings of The Geopolitical Relations between Contemporary
Mongolia and Neighboring Asian Countries:  Democracy, Economy and Security ( Mongolian
and Tibetan Affairs Commission Conference, September 2003), pp. 329-330.
5 Ibid., pg. 333.
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Searching for a Third Neighbor
Russian troop withdrawal was completed on September 15, 1992.
Mongolian leaders recognized that it was necessary to declare their intention
to pursue a new foreign policy of balanced relations with Russia and the PRC.
As Dr. Ts. Batbayar has said, “The top priority in Mongolia’s next diplomacy
was to fill the vacuum in its foreign relations created by the Soviet Union’s
disintegration.”6  Thus, in this climate of crisis and uncertainty began a debate,
which continues to the present, of devising a new approach to economic and
strategic security for the Mongolian nation. Often this security debate is labeled:
Mongolia’s search for a Third Neighbor—a concept attributed to U.S. Secretary
of State James Baker on his 1991 trip to Mongolia, who noted that Mongolia
has two good neighbors, but, if it needed a third, the U.S. would be happy to be
it.
The main pillars of Mongolia’s new international strategy were
incorporated in Mongolia’s National Security Concept adopted on June 30,
1994.  This document, approved by the Mongolian Parliament, emphasizes a
balanced policy towards the country’s two giant neighbors, underlines the
importance of economic security in protecting Mongolia’s national integrity,
and warns about too much dependence on any one country for trade.
Japan
Initially, the Mongols thought that they could look for a strong economic
partner for protection, hoping that the end of the Cold War meant politics and
military might were no longer vitally essential to sustain national sovereignty
and be a successful nation.  Such a view was logical in the context of the early
1990s when the Big and Little Tigers of Asia were militarily weak but
economically powerful.  The prime example of this philosophy was Japan, which
already had a historical interest in Mongolia and some economic investments
in the cashmere hair sector.  It was thought that Japan would be willing to be
active in Mongolia’s economy, because Japan organized for Mongolia broad-
based assistance programs as early as 1991 and offered to host regular
international donor coordination conferences in Tokyo.  Japanese assistance
was channeled towards satellite telecommunications and railroad upgrading,
so that in 1991 total Japanese aid to Mongolia jumped more than ten times.7
Japan became Mongolia’s largest international donor, usually giving $70-90
6 Ibid, pp. 333-334.
7, Batbayar, “Mongolia’s Foreign Policy,”ibid., pg. 193.
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million in aid per year.  Just from 1993 to 1997 Japan’s development assistance
totaled $US507 million, $261 million in grant aid, $127 million in technical
cooperation, and $118 million in loans.8
There were many exchanges of visits at the level of Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister, and by 1996 with the accession of the Mongolian Democratic
Coalition Government to power; both sides were calling for a new comprehensive
partnership concept that would cover political and security as well as economic
relations.  At the end of the 1990s the Japanese government pledged 16 billion
yen for the renovation of the fourth Ulaanbaatar power generation station and
agreed to bring 500 Mongolian students to Japan for study in a period of three
years.
There has been some confusion among the Mongol people by the sudden
rapprochement with Japan, but since Mongolia is one of the few Asian countries
which did not experience any brutalities from the Japanese military during World
War II, there is not any deep enmity even among older Mongols.  However, it
became evident that Japan’s direct investment in the Mongolian economy during
the first decade of democratization, which was only 11.7% of the total (down
from 23.2% in 1995), was very disappointing to the Mongols.9  Mongolia’s
exports to Japan also wildly fluctuated.  In 1990 they stood at $7.6 million, in
1995 increased to $46.7 million, while in 1999—reflecting Japan’s own domestic
economic crisis—plunged to $10.9 million.  In 2000 this drop continued to $8.1
million.10  Moreover, Mongolia’ trade deficit with Japan grew dramatically.
Imports of $9.8 million which in 1990 had been close in value to exports, jumped
to $45.3 million in 1995 and even to $115 million in 1999.  Then the Mongolian
Government, in an attempt to rein in the imbalance, limited Japanese imports to
$73.3 million in 2000, which still was 12% of total imports.11 Such realities of
doing business with Japan have convinced Mongolian leaders that Japan is
not in a position to be a true “Third Neighbor” for Mongolia.
The United States
During the early transition period some Mongols, including the first
democratically elected President, Ochirbat, believed it was very important to
quickly establish a strong relationship with the winner of the Cold War—the
8  Ibid., pg. 203.
9 Terry McKinley, “The National Development Strategy and aid coordination,” Poverty
Reduction in Mongolia, Keith Griffin ed., Asia Pacific Press (Australia: 2003), pg. 140.
10 Mongolian Statistical Yearbook 2000  (Ulaanbaatar, 2001), pg. 178.
11 Ibid., pp. 179-180.
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United States.  Foreign Minister Erdenechuluun in 1999 wrote, “To many
Mongolian politicians and government officials, the U.S. would appear as the
savior of new Mongolia and “major pillar” in its national security.”12
Policymakers from both countries saw strategic advantages in strengthening
the bilateral relationship.  The United States valued Mongolia’s window on
Russia and the PRC and from the beginning of the democratic era sought to
create a stable free market and democratic model which would positively
influence the North Asian region.  Although the U.S. was only the third largest
provider of donor assistance (which was given entirely as grants with no loans)
to Mongolia, in reality there was the donor perception by Mongolia and others
in the international community that the U.S. set the agenda.  It was the United
States that took the lead in devising and supporting programs to accelerate
Mongolia’s political reforms and transition to a free market economy.  It
supported Mongolia’s membership in the IMF and the World Bank, implemented
banking reforms, retrained the judiciary, promoted non-governmental
organization (NGO) development, pushed for quick privatization of state-owned
entities and industries, championed the establishment of a free press, and put
Mongolia on the international radar screen in a positive way.  If this leadership
role had been assumed by Japan or Europe, I believe 14 years into the transition,
Mongolia’s society and economy would look very different from what has
emerged today.
The U.S. in the early transition years was not afraid to invest through
joint ventures, especially in the mining, oil, and camel hair sectors.  By the end
of the century there were over fifty U.S-Mongolian joint ventures.  However,
investment momentum slowed down to the point where the Mongolian
Ambassador to the U.S., Ravdangiin Bold, in August 2004 told a Mongolian
reporter that American investment was stubbornly stagnant.  For example, in
1995 U.S. investment was 7.5% of total foreign investment.  In the 1990-2001
periods this investment share was still 7.3%.13However, Mongolian-made textiles
found a big export market in the U.S. since 1999, when Mongolia was granted
free-trade status.  Exports to the U.S. which totaled $900,000 in 1990 skyrocketed
to $92.9 million in 2000, second only to China’s $274.3 million.  U.S. imported
goods rose from zero in 1990 to $28.4 million by 2000 (ranked 6th).14
12 L. Erdenchuluun, “Mongolia’s strategic options,”Northeast Asia towards 2000:
Interdependence and Conflict?, K. Kho and K. Moller, ed. (Baden-Baden, Germany: 1999).
13 McKinley, pp. 140.
14 Ibid., pp. 179-180.
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The U.S., which had offered Mongolia emergency energy assistance back
in 1991, then provided emergency butter and wheat in the mid-1990s, was very
active in supplying emergency aid during the harsh winter dzud disasters for
three successive years from 1999-2002.  Perhaps one of the most significant
aspects of the growing bilateral relations has been in defense cooperation for
military education and training to modernize the Mongolian armed forces for
international peacekeeping activities.  American foreign policy experts have
described bilateral consultations on improving Mongolia’s border
communications as helping “…Mongolia balance its bilateral relationships with
its two large neighbors and its relationships with other countries in the region.”15
Yet, former U.S. Ambassador to Mongolia, Alphonse La Porta suggests that
the U.S. and Mongolia have moved beyond the rhetorical “third neighbor”
approach cited by Secretary of State James Baker,16 and no American official
today will declare that the U.S. is willing to protect Mongolia from any enemies.
Northeast Asia
In the mid-1990s after no single nation rose to assume the mantle of
“Third Neighbor,” Mongolian thinking turned to advocating a new relationship
with Northeast Asia that went beyond economic ties to include political
considerations.  Policy strategists including R. Bold, then President of the
Strategic Studies Centre and now Ambassador to the U.S.; 17 J. Enkhsaihan,
former Secretary of the National Security Council and former Mongolian
Ambassador to the U.N. in NYC;18 late Kh. Olzvoy, former Ambassador to the
U.N. in NYC19; and especially L. Erdenechuluun, former Mongolian Ambassador
15 Alphonse La Porta and Andrew J. Critchfield, “U.S.-Mongolian Relations:  Two
Years of Progress,” in The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, No. 7, 2000, pp. 5-
6.
16 For further discussion on the Baker statement see the memoir of late ambassador
Olzvoy, who participated in negotiations with Secretary Baker in July 1990, Kh. Olzvoi,
“J. Beikeriin Ailchlal xiigeed “guravdaxi tunsh”—uun asuudald,”Olon Ulsin Xariltsaa World
Affairs, Vol. 184 (5), 2002, No. 1 (Ulaanbaatar,), pp. 166-168.
17 R. Bold, “The Security of Small State:  Option for Mongolia,” RSIM, No. 9, 2001.
A more expansive version of Bold’s views are found in his Mongolian-language book,
Mongolin ayulgui baidlin orchin, batlan xamraalax bodlogin zarim asuudald,  Strategic
Studies Center (Ulaanbaatar, 1996).
18 J. Enkhsaihan, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status:  Concept and Practice,” RSIM, No. 5,
2000.
19 Kh. Olzvoy, “A Mongol’s View of Economic Development and Cooperation in
Northeast Asia, Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, No. 3, (Ulaanbaatar:  1966).
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to the U.N. in NYC and now Foreign Minister, all promoted close association
with Northeast Asia as the key to Mongolia’s economic growth, national security,
and integration into the global economy.  As Minister Erdenechuluun wrote,
“…a single regional player able to outweigh Russia and China can simply not
be conceived of in the foreseeable future.  One might therefore not think of this
neighbor in terms of a single country, but rather as a group of countries.”20
Ambassador Olzvoy was even more specific, “Northeast Asia is expected to
play a greater role in the diversification and expansion of Mongolia’s foreign
economic activities.”21
It might be speculated that seeds for this viewpoint were sown by the rise
in the first half of the 1990s of what has been called “The New Asianism”—”an
idea that Southeast Asians and Northeast Asians are united by common values
rooted in shared Asian cultural traditions that differentiate them from
Westerners.”22  This theory’s proponents were inspired by regional leaders
such as Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir and Singapore’s retired Prime
Minister Lee Kwan Yew.  The Asian mood was very upbeat, “The tremendous
economic progress which has been made by the Pacific Rim countries in general,
and the market economies of Northeast Asia in particular, portends an exciting
new Pacific Era in the upcoming 21st century.”23  However, most Mongolian
policymakers, even before the 1997-1998 Asian financial crises which exposed
the weaknesses of the East Asian economic miracle, were reluctant to embrace
Asia if that meant rejecting western countries.  Likely this was because the
nomadic traditional civilization and more recent Soviet-style command economy
of the Mongols had few shared values and philosophy with other Asian nations.
More importantly, I believe, is the fact that the Mongols were not convinced
that Mongolia’s security could be guaranteed by economic means alone.
This is why Mongolian strategists saw both the necessary role of military
and political power and the United States as an essential economic partner and
20 Erdenchuluun, ibid., pg. 95.
21 Khumbagyn Olzvoy, “Political and Economic Aspects of Mongolia’s Transition
into a Market Economy,” Regional Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia, Proceedings
of the Yongpyeong Conference (Yongpyeong, South Korea:  September 26-28, 1993), pp.
215-216.
22 John Miller, “The Roots and Implications of East Asian Regionalism,”
 Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Occasional Paper Series, Honolulu, August
2004, pg. 6.
23 Won-Shik Chung, “Toward a Sharing Community:  Multilateral Economic
Cooperation Prospects in Northeast Asia,” Regional Economic Cooperation, ibid., pg. 24.
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ultimate guarantor of regional security.  Even Ambassador Olzvoy, who did not
include the U.S. in his 1996 definition of Northeast Asia, did not believe the
effects of the Cold War could be swept from the region in only a few years, and
predicted that Mongolia would come strategically under the economic umbrella
of the U.S., as well as the Japanese and South Koreans.24
Mongolia was comfortable with a definition of Northeast Asia which was
expanded to embrace, if not to actually include, the U.S. and Canada across the
Pacific Ocean, as well as the usual Northeast Asian countries.  Dr. Otgonbaatar,
Dean of the School of International Relations at Mongolian National University,
has written:  “Interpretations are underway to include west coast of Canada,
Northern parts of the Pacific realm such as American Hawaii and Alaska which
shows, in turn what kind of important role those countries play in the region.”25
Russia and the PRC
This same realistic attitude was evident in Mongolia’s opinion about its
two neighbors, Russia and the PRC, as crucial to the mix.  Although the neighbors
were the very countries Mongolia sought to counterbalance, by including
them in the Northeast Asian paradigm, it was less threatening to Russia and
PRC China, as well as an attempt to use the other regional players and North
America as influential agents to modify Russian and Chinese behavior within
the region.  Integrating Russia and the PRC into Mongolia’s vision of Northeast
Asia was necessary because both countries had developed significant trade
and investment ties in Mongolia.
By 1995 the disruption of Russian trade, resulting from the collapse of the
COMECON system of the Soviet Union, was over.  In that year Mongolia
imported $208 million of Russian products (20% in fuels and lubricants) and
exported $68.9 million worth of copper (73.5% of all exports), fluorspar
concentrate, and animal products to Russia.26  Nevertheless, Russia was
gradually driven out of the Mongolian market by the end of the decade from
85% of the market share to only 25% in 1999.  Especially Mongolian export
volume to Russia fell about 5 times because of high customs and transportation
costs and insolvency of Russian buyers.  Russia did continue as a key supplier
24 Olzvoy, “A Mongol’s View,” ibid., pg. 66.
25 Otgonbaatar, “North East Asian Co-operation and Development Prospectives,”
Political, Security, Economic and Infrastructure Factors of Economic Cooperation in the
Northeast Asia,  ed. Lh. Nyamtseren, Mongolian Development Research Center,
Ulaanbaatar, 2002, pg. 38.
26 Batbayar, “Mongolia’s Foreign Policy,”ibid., pp. 103-104.
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of oil and some electricity, which is why Russia still is the largest exporter to
Mongolia (33.6% of the market in 2000).  Russia’s loss in the Mongolian market
can be attributed to both Mongolia’s diversification of trade, and particularly
to the PRC’s rapid ascent in the Mongolian market.  Russian investment fell
steeply during the 1990s to 6% over the 1990-2001 periods, even though Russia
has retained its key joint ventures in the copper mine at Erdenet and the
Ulaanbaatar Railway (out of a total of 170 joint ventures).27  There has been an
upturn in Russian investment since 2003.
Batbayar reports that trade with the PRC increased from less than 2 percent
in 1989 to about 24% in 1993, and almost 59% in 2000.  Although the percentage
fluctuated during the 1990s, the PRC’s emergence as the key Mongolian trade
partner is evident in statistics from the Mongolian Statistical Yearbook 2000.  In
1990 PRC China exported only $11.3 million and imported $22.3 million worth of
goods.  By 2000 Chinese exports rose to $400.1 million (20% of Mongolia’s total
amount in 2000) and imports stood at $125.8 million (Mongolia’s largest
customer).  Chinese exports were mostly food, consumer goods, and
construction materials.  Mongolia’s exports included animal skins and hides,
cashmere and wool, and copper. The great spurt in the PRC’s Mongolian imports
at the end of the decade is due to the fact that it has become a key importer of
mineral products, especially copper concentrate, from Mongolia to resell to
third countries.  The PRC became Mongolia’s second largest trade partner in
1995 and since 1999 its first largest.28
Korean Peninsula:
A new but significant reason for seeing Northeast Asia as a “Third
Neighbor” was South Korea, because in the early 1990s, it appeared to be a
good model for development for Mongolia.  Mongolia is one of the few countries
to practice full-scale diplomatic relations with both Koreas and conscientious
about maintaining a balanced relationship.  Mongols and South Koreans feel a
common racial, linguistic and historical bond which explains the high hopes
both nations had in the 1990s for the expansion of economic and educational
ties.  The KOICA (Korean International Cooperation Agency) has had an active,
growing grant aid and technical cooperation program in Mongolia since 1991.29
27 Batbayar and Demberel, ibid., pg. 343.
28 Batbayar, “Mongolia’s Foreign Policy,” ibid., pp. 104, 137-139.
29 Ibid., pg. 210.  In 1992 KOICA granted $356,000 in aid.  By 1999 this grew to
$814,000.
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In the 1990s trade turnover increased from $9 million in 1991 ($8.1 million
in imported ROK goods) to about $60 million in 2000 ($54.4 million in ROK
imports), making South Korea the fifth largest trade partner for Mongolia (8.4%
of Mongolia’s total trade).30  In the new century, the number of Korean imports
has increased even more, particularly in cars, SUVS, and consumer goods.  It is
claimed Korean FDI amounted to about $60 million in 280 joint ventures by the
end of 2000.  Most of this was connected to Korean textile manufacturers using
Mongolia’s quota free status with the U.S., although big investors include
Korea Telecom in the state owned Mongolian Telecom, Samsung mining with
Erdenet copper mine, Hyundai and Kia car companies, and the Skytel mobile
phone joint venture.31  However, according to Korean statistical reporting, in
2000 Korea only opened in Mongolia 6 new investment projects worth about
$1.5 million which was called “insignificantly small.”32
Perhaps more importantly, South Korea, in response to its own economic
crisis in 1998, welcomed cheap Mongol labor, often illegal, in its factories.  At
least 15,000 Mongols work in the country and send earnings home.  Among
these workers are a number of Mongolian professional boxers and athletes,
who use Korea as a stepping stone to further international recognition.  Korean
universities have established Mongolian language departments and scientific
expeditions to Mongolia have been sponsored by the Korean Government and
private NGOS.
As for Mongolia’s relations with North Korea (DPRK) in the 1990s, the
previous communist era economic ties have basically dried up.  However, the
diplomatic and parliamentary contacts have persisted at a high level.  Mongolia
even provided food assistance from time to time.  In 1999 the DPRK was forced
for monetary reasons to close its Embassy in Ulaanbaatar, but still Mongol
Government officials at the ministerial rank continue to engage North Korea on
bilateral trade issues and hold discussions on reduction of nuclear weapons.
Also, there are continuing cultural exchanges for artists and children.
Major Impacts on Strategic Calculations for Mongolia’s Northeast Asian
Integration
During the decade of the 1990s and early years of the new century,
Mongolia has seen several factors impacting on its strategy of pursuing
30 Ibid., pg. 211.
31 Ibid., pg. 212.
32 Ko Sangtu, “Korea’s Trade and Investment with China, Russia and Mongolia in
1990’s,”Political, Security, ibid., pg. 67.
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economic and foreign policies designed to forge closer relations with Northeast
Asia.  These factors, while not negating the importance of Northeast Asia for
Mongolia, have significantly altered the rosy picture first painted by
policymakers at the beginning of the democratic era.
Asian Economic crisis
Mongolia emerged from its communist isolation in 1990 to see an Asia full
of successful economies able to navigate the international trade system in a
way that brought prosperity and respect for their peoples.  It saw the 4 Asian
tigers of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, each unique but following
the same pattern of protected by western, usually U.S., military power, and
given economic access to the U.S. market.  These tigers themselves were
investors in Southeast Asia, and crucial to the development of the next
generation of little tigers in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
Asian nations even were investing in Russia and the PRC.  Although the
Japanese Bubble had burst, this was not at all clear in the early 1990s.  The
Asia-Pacific seemed the most dynamic region of the world, and PRC China
finally was concentrating on economics and rejecting polemics in order to grow
into the economic giant that had been predicted for over a century.  Mongolia
thought it could ally itself with its neighbors in Northeast Asia to learn the
development process and ride the bandwagon to prosperity.  It was thought
that it was a time to rely on economics for security, because the Cold War had
ended serious military confrontations.
However, by the time that Mongolia dismantled its Soviet-installed
command economy, privatized its livestock and industrial holdings, struggled
through serious energy and food crises, and re-wrote its laws to encourage
foreign investment and establish a free market legal regime, something had
happened to the Asian miracle.  The nations which Mongolia thought would be
eager to invest in the country’s vast mineral and animal wealth, especially
Japan and South Korea, were contracting because of financial scandals.
Bankruptcies followed and then loss of faith in Asian institutions.  Money for
investment dried up or retreated home.  As of 2000 Mongolian FDI, which
represented 4.2% of GDP, did not flow predominantly to the mining sector (only
15.5%), which was the case historically in other resource-rich developing
countries.  An UNDP 2000 poverty study in Mongolia noted that Japan’s share
of foreign investment in Mongolia was over 23% in 1995 but fell dramatically to
only 12% at the end of the decade.  South Korean investment was somewhat
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better in the second half of the 1990s, rising from 8% of FDI to 13.4% in 2000.33
Dreams like the Tumen River Project and a Northeast Asian Free Trade
Association languished, as did Mongolia’s belief that its national security and
economic development just could be put into the hands of Northeast Asian
countries.
Yet, hopes that Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia can find a way to
move forward on steps toward free trade agreements have revived.  Recently,
ASEAN and Japanese ministers agreed to open negotiations on a free trade
pact in April 2005.  This follows on the heels of on-going separate negotiations
with the PRC, with scheduled negotiations to begin in January 2005 with South
Korea.34  However, this latest strategy de-emphasizes a Northeast Asia regional
approach, which would be more beneficial to small Mongolia, in favor of
agreements with individual Northeast Asian nations.  Suren Badral in Mongolia’s
Foreign Ministry Department of Multilateral Cooperation has criticized this
development, “Though the bilateral arrangements of the leading Northeast
Asian countries with the ASEAN are not necessarily separatist or selfish acts,
they establish precedence for other NEA countries to shift their policy priorities
to the ASEAN-centered regional process such as ARF and to intensification of
their bilateral ties within the region….On the other hand, the centripetal to [sic]
ASEAN process has detracting and distracting implications on the years-long
efforts made by many scholars, academic institutions and some governments
in Northeast Asia to forge own [sic] regional mechanisms.”35
September 11, 2001, the War on Terrorism, and Iraq
The 9/11 terrorist attack and the U.S. Government-led War on Terrorism
with its doctrine of preventive military action, changed the strategic landscape
in the world.  Mongolia and the Northeast Asian region it lived in did not
escape. The Bush II administration drove out the Taliban Government in
Afghanistan and reached out to Central Asian countries never part of the U.S.
sphere of influence to set up military arrangements and bases next to the
underbelly of a weak Russian state.  At the same time, Russia and the PRC were
persuaded to join the War against Terrorism, which improved U.S. relations
33 McKinley, ibid., pp. 140-141.
34 The New York Times, “Progress is Made Toward Free Trade Pacts Linking Asian
Regions,” (New York) September 5, 2004.
35 Suren Badral, “Prospects for Political and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia,”
The 5th Symposium on Northeast Asian Security,” RSIM, Vol. 15, (Institute for Strategic
Studies, Ulaanbaatar), 2002, pg. 17.
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with both countries, because other points of confrontation were covered up in
the cooperative and pragmatic interest of mounting a global effort.
Mongolia immediately rallied to the U.S. side against the Islamic
fundamentalists and was the first country in the world to issue a stamp honoring
the Twin Towers to raise money for the victims’ families.  Mongolian leaders
saw the opportunity to publicly support the American Government as a way to
significantly raise the nation’s international profile and gain favorable attention
from the Bush Administration.  The main actions Mongolia took were to create
a peacekeeping agency within its Ministry of Defense, accept U.S. military
assistance for training the peacekeeper soldiers, and then dispatched Mongolian
troops to Afghanistan to protect the new government.  These actions were well
publicized to the U.S. Congress which continued to fund Mongolian assistance
projects at a relatively high level.
When the United States in 2003 launched an attack against Saddam Hussein
and invaded Iraq, Mongolian President Bagabandi and Prime Minister Enkhbayar
quickly agreed to join the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq, and have sent 3
rotations of 160 troops each.  The war is not unpopular among the people, but
has been questioned in the press.  The Mongolian Government hopes to use
its support for U.S. policy as a successful bargaining chip in other areas of
bilateral relations.
Several factors likely played a part in Mongolia’s bold moves to support
U.S. policies on terrorism and Iraq, not sanctioned by either the PRC or Russia.
1) Mongolia’s western  regions are the home to its Kazak Muslim minority,
which could fall under the influence of radical fundamentalists as happened in
Afghanistan and thus threaten the stability of the country.  2) Since 9/11,
tension has grown on the Korean Peninsula and Mongolia feels increasing
need of an outside protector in this unipolar world.  3) Mongolia has decided it
should become a more active and independent player in Asian regional politics
and show more visibility in the international arena as a way to counter PRC
China’s expanding influence.  4) Mongolia has seen the rise in favor and influence
of certain Central Asian republics which permitted bases to be opened by the
U.S. in the war on terrorism.
Mongolia does not want to be shut out of a role in determining the future
of Northeast and Central Asia, so it is willing to participate in military operations
to retain its influence with the Bush Administration.  It has made the offer to
grant landing rights to American military planes. The recent massacre in Beslan,
Russia by Chechen terrorists, seemingly with support from Al Qaida elements,
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will likely make the Mongolian Government even more supportive of global
anti-terrorism policies.
Nuclear policies on the Korean Peninsula
Mongolia declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1992, with
the ending of its special relationship with the Soviet Union and the withdrawal
of all Soviet troops.  It was hoped that Mongolia’s actions would positively
influence the region.  In 1995 R. Bold, then senior fellow in Mongolia’s Institute
for Strategic Studies (affiliated with the Ministry of Defense), delivered a paper
in Hokkaido on Mongolia’s views on the idea of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
in Northeast Asia:  “Coming shortly after the encouraging bilateral declaration
to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula in December 1991, it appeared that—with
adherence to the three non-nuclear principles of Japan—some real broad basis
could be laid down to establish a nuclear-free-zone in the Northeast Asia.”36
He and other notable Mongol strategic planners thought that the end of the
Cold War would create an atmosphere more favorable to the creation of such a
zone in the North Pacific.  He did foresee that the Korean Peninsula’s situation
made the issue very complex, but he felt that Mongolia “could become an
excellent nuclear-free-bridge between nuclear-weapon-free zones of the Central
and Northeast Asia.”37
Throughout the 1990s Mongol leaders believed they should promote
their own non-nuclear policies, and therefore hosted several important nuclear
security conferences to focus regional and U.S. attention on this issue.  Some
western experts such as Dr. Stephen Noerper of the Asia Foundation in Mongolia
maintained that Mongolia is a valuable resource on and contact with North
Korea:  “Mongolia views itself as a potential mediator in Korean peninsular
affairs, especially given its good relations with both Pyongyang and Seoul and
historic, linguistic, and ethnic ties….And Mongolia, with a decade of transitional
experience from a Stalinist system, may well have much to offer the peninsula.”38
36 R. Bold, The Mongolia’s Strategic View (The Institute for Strategic Studies:
Ulaanbaatar, 1996), pg. 40.
37 Ibid., pg. 41.
38 Stephen E. Noerper, “Of Horsemen and Hermits:  Mongolia, North Korea and the
New Security Architecture in Northeast Asia, “Olon Ulsin Xarilstaa, World Affairs, Vol.
196 (6), 2002, no. 2 (Ulaanbaatar), pg. 108.
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Events in the new millennium have illustrated that Mongolian calculations
on the poor likelihood of North Korea producing a nuclear weapon were wrong.39
North Korea’s own declarations early this year on its nuclear bomb-making and
breaking of its promises to the Clinton Administration, and the September 2004
revelations about South Korea’s nuclear experiments prove that only Mongolia
and Japan in Northeast Asia have no nuclear capabilities.  Japan is well protected
by the U.S. nuclear umbrella.  Japanese previous ambivalent coexistence with
the DPRK has been shocked by the revelations about Japanese kidnapped by
the North in the 1970s, sinking of a North Korean spy boat, and firing of a test
missile into Japanese waters.  Japanese public attitude towards the North has
been transformed into great distrust, which mirrors that of the Bush II
Administration.  Mongolia has offered to be a bridge between Washington and
Pyongyang.  However, since the Iraq invasion, the PRC, Russia, South Korea,
and Japan have moved to engage the North in preliminary negotiations to
avoid open confrontation with the U.S.  To date these have not made much
tangible progress.  Mongolia also has its own problem as a facilitator for North
Korean refugees fleeing to the South, which if not carefully handled could
spiral out of control.  All of these factors indicate that the continuing instability
of the political situation on the Korean Peninsula is a large negative for
Mongolian and Northeast Asian integration.
Growing dominance of the PRC in the Mongolian market—lackluster
western investment
Although Mongolia from the very beginning of its democratic era in 1990
recognized that it must handle its economic relations with its southern neighbor
very carefully to avoid domination of the domestic economy, it has not succeeded
in managing this process.  At best, it just has slowed down the pace of expansion.
Mongolia adopted a Foreign Investment Law in 1990, which was revised
significantly in later years.  But, no revisions could overcome the country’s land-
locked status and high transportation costs which have inhibited foreign
investment from western countries.  Changes in mining legislation and customs
and tax laws have encouraged U.S. and Canadian investors in minerals and oil,
but even these investors see their market as PRC China (e.g. Ivanhoe Mining of
Canada’s new copper discovery in the Gobi is slated to go to the Chinese).
39 Bold claimed “the North is still far from reaching a technological level to produce a
so-called “nuclear bomb…”  “A nation’s efforts to conduct nuclear research, or its acquisition
of nuclear power generating and reprocessing capabilities do not necessary [sic] indicate a
[sic] intention to obtain nuclear bombs.”  The Mongolia’s Strategic View, ibid., pg. 27.
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The PRC needs Mongolian resources such as copper, meat, and animal
hair, and at the same time it offers Mongolia cheap consumer goods, fresh
vegetables and fruits, and construction materials.  There is no overcoming the
fact that the PRC is well positioned to exploit the opening of Mongolia’s economy
to foreign investors.  Chinese at first were kept out of the energy and mineral
sectors, so joint ventures were established mainly in construction, restaurants,
and retail sales.  The low requirement for initial investment capital has made it
easy for Chinese to register for small-scale joint ventures, and actually just buy
raw materials to export them back home for value-added processing.40  By 2001
the PRC had the largest number of joint ventures (687 officially registered) and
was the largest investor with $136.9 million, which represented 28.6% of total
FDI.  If Hong Kong’s investments are added to the PRC, the total rises to about
one-third.41
However, the average size of the investment is below the national average.
As of 2001 there was no company among China’s invested companies and joint
ventures that had an investment of more than $1 million. “The quality, profit
results, and size of China’s investment are low compared to trade turnover and
potential of the two countries.”42  By the end of the 1990s 88.9% of copper ore,
100% of unrefined oil, 98.9% of metal waste, 98-100% of leather and hides, and
98.6% of unprocessed wool went from Mongolia to the PRC.43  Now there are 10
border trading points, and a full-scale proposal to develop a free trade zone at
Zamin Uud.  Although bids for the Zamin Uud Trade Development Zone went
out last spring and a Chinese developer was chosen, it remains to be seen how
the new coalition government will go forward.  Mongolian authorities have
now permitted Chinese exploration in the mineral sector, and some speculate
that that the mining industry will be the most successful industry for trade and
cooperation between Mongolia and China.44  All of these trends do not bode
well for the independence of Mongolia’s economy.  Unless more effort and
planning are put into diversifying the investment base and trade pattern,
Mongolia in a decade could become an economic colony of the PRC, and
endanger its national integrity.
40 Batbayar, Mongolia’s Foreign Policy, ibid., pg. 143.
41 McKinley, ibid., pg. 141.
42 D.Shurkhuu, “Mongol-Sino Economic Relations and Cooperation in the New Age of
Globalization,” The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, No. 8-9 (Ulaanbaatar)
2002, pg. 85.
43 N. Altantsetseg, “Russian-Mongolian and Sino-Mongolian Relations since nineties,”
Geopolitical Relations, ibid., pg. 375.
44 Shurkhuu, ibid., pg. 83.
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Donor policies
Mongolia is the fifth most donor-aid dependent country in the world.
Official Development assistance (ODA) of nearly $1.9 billion in the 1990s
accounted for 24% of the GDP, and almost one-third of the national budget.
With this amount of assistance, growth was expected to be rapid.  Instead the
growth of per capita income has been slow and in the second half of the 1990s
the growth rate fell.  Instead of contributing to faster growth, foreign aid has
been a replacement for the Soviet aid of the socialist period, a substitute for
taxation, a discouragement to savings, and mainly used to sustain consumption.
Economic expert Terry McKinley, who did a UNDP-funded study, asserts that
“The problem is that the very large inflows of foreign aid and modest inflows of
private foreign investment have had a low return, measured in terms of their
impact on the growth rate.  Donors either are not aware of this or are
complacent.”45  Because large inflows of foreign aid push up the exchange rate,
Mongolia’s goods are less competitive in world markets and locally produced
products are less competitive than imported goods.
Added to the equation is Mongolia’s rise in foreign indebtedness, which
eventually will provoke a debt crisis:  Mongolia’s external debt as a ratio to GDP
in 1997 was close to 60%, while the rate for 2001 was nearly 90%.46  There is
much evidence that donor assistance and lending policies during Mongolia’s
democratic era have actually increased poverty.  I myself have recently done an
extensive analysis of foreign donor assistance to Mongolia’s rural sector, and
the waste and failure if these policies are, unfortunately, significant.47
Domestic politics—election crises
Mongolia since 1996 has been a rollercoaster of domestic political intrigue.
No one, Mongol or foreign, predicted the huge election victory by the coalition
of democratic parties in 1996, which ousted the ex-communist MPRP from power
after 70 years.  The next four years of Coalition Government were a major
disappointment to the local populace and foreign friends, because the Coalition
partners could not put aside their rivalries and greed to cooperate and govern.
With 3 Prime Ministers and 9 months of no Prime Minister, there was
45 McKinley, ibid., pp. 145-6.
46 Ibid., pp. 142-143.
47 Alicia Campi, “The Foreign Donor and NGO Community’s Policies toward Pastoral
Nomadism in Mongolia in the Post-Socialist Era, at the Present State and Perspectives of
Nomadism in a Globalizing World UNESCO-sponsored conference (Ulaanbaatar: August
2004).
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parliamentary gridlock and the role of the President expanded to fill the vacuum.
The full consequences of this latter development still are playing out.  When
the MPRP was decisively returned to power in 2000, scores were settled and
corruption reached new heights.  Power politics between the MPRP Prime
Minister and President reflected the conflict over roles.  The resulting bad
feelings were played out again in the June 2004 election when the Prime Minister
and MPRP for a time refused to accept the results of the election and considered
finding a way to remove the President, who was upholding the integrity of the
results.  With a closely divided electorate reflected in the new Parliament,
Mongolia is embarking on an unknown road called “coalition government”
with all Mongol partners full of suspicion.  The future, including any united
policy towards Northeast Asia, seems full of problems.
Conclusion
In the 1990s Mongolian thinking about Northeast Asia expanded beyond
strategic and political considerations to economic ties.  Yet, hopes for large
investment from a diverse group of Northeast Asian countries to counterbalance
the influence of Mongolia’s two giant neighbors have only been partially
realized.  Mongolia had hoped that economic integration with other Northeast
Asian nations would secure its sovereignty and economic development.  The
Asian financial crisis and the PRC’s unstoppable penetration of Mongolia’s
economy have shaken the belief that political and security issues can be
avoided.
Mongolian strategic thinkers do recognize that there is great diversity
among Northeast Asian countries, and “there is no consensus on new
mechanisms and processes which are needed as well as norms and principles
which might be applicable for the subregion.”48  They have called for innovative
approaches to cooperation to deepen understanding through a multilateral
security dialogue and realize economic cooperation.
Ambassador Bold saw economic relations among the open economies of
Japan, South Korea, and the U.S., as crucial to the economic dynamism of the
region and to prospects for deepening economic interdependence with the
closed or formerly closed economies of Russia, the PRC, and North Korea.  He
also emphasized the value of a gradual approach via intensifying security
dialogues to dissolve old identities and constructive new, more positive ones.49
48 Bold, The Mongolia’s Strategic View, ibid., pg. 44.
49 Ibid., pg. 47.
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Badral at the Mongolian Foreign Ministry is also realistic about the many
obstacles to multilateral cooperation, noting that it is in Northeast Asia where
there are residual legacies of the Cold War, but he doubts that bilateral security
arrangements are sufficient and all inclusive.50
Expansion of the Northeast Asian continental group of nations to include
active and interested partners across the Pacific, the U.S. and Canada, has been
a feature of Mongolia’s democratic era, and in the main worked to Mongolia’s
advantage.  However, such deepening ties carry a dangerous potential to pull
the country into global politics and transnational problems, as exemplified by
the War on Terrorism, Afghanistan and Iraq.  At the same time, renewed military
tension on the Korean peninsula has shaken up traditional Mongolian foreign
policy strategic planning, and has left Mongolia as the lone nuclear-free player
without a protective nuclear ally in the region.
Mongolia’s dependence on foreign donor assistance has put its
development and security future in the hands of Americans and Europeans to
a degree which should be of concern to national leaders.  Unfortunately, we
have not seen any serious domestic discussion of the impact of donor aid on
national policy.  Mongolia’s internal political experiment with democracy, while
vibrant and always interesting, has produced much indecision and contributed
to “donor fatigue.”  At this point, integration with Northeast Asia does not
appear to be the solution to all of the country’s many challenges, but Mongolia
knows that it cannot escape the geography of the region and so still wants to
be an active participant in deciding Northeast Asia’s future.
50 Badral, ibid., pg. 20.
